Ferguson at Kings Mountain
Major Patrick Ferguson’s proclamation to the Overmountain men stands as one of those decisive moments that altered the course of the southern campaign. He demanded that the Overmountain men desist from rebellion or he would bring fire and sword down upon them and hang their leaders. In issuing that decree, Ferguson did the one thing Clinton and Cornwallis did not want him to do: he set the Back Country in flame against the Crown. The flame burned so bright and fierce that the population rose against Ferguson and his Loyalist militia with the vengeance of a people who felt deeply insulted.
The men who answered that challenge came from North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and the Watauga Settlements of what is now Tennessee. When Ferguson pushed into the far reaches of South Carolina, he meant to demonstrate that England still controlled the royal colony and that its inhabitants were its total masters. The settlers beyond the mountains were the people he most needed to cow. Yet Ferguson either misunderstood them or simply looked down upon them. They were a proud people long accustomed to fighting for survival against the Cherokee and other Indian nations to the west. Ferguson’s threat to cross the mountains, burn their towns, and hang their leaders amounted to a declaration of war against communities already locked in constant struggle with Native peoples.
These same settlers had already formed an almost self-sufficient government. They had done so because they were violating English law by settling across the mountains in defiance of the Proclamation of 1763, which forbade such settlements in order to honor treaties with the tribes. They never expected the British to come to their aid against the natives, but they did expect to be left alone. After all, they provided a useful barrier between the royal colonies and the Indian nations. Ferguson’s call for them to aid the Crown therefore produced a reaction he was unprepared to meet. Instead of answering the summons or remaining neutral out of fear, they did what came naturally: they chose to fight to protect their lives and homes.
They gathered in the Watauga Settlements, left half their strength to guard against the natives, and sent the other half after Ferguson to make plain that he would neither push them around nor force them to bow to the Crown. At Sycamore Shoals they organized the march and dispatched riders into the Carolinas and Virginia to summon help. Those riders found willing allies. As the force moved south to intercept Ferguson, its numbers grew until, at the foot of Kings Mountain, the men were ready to charge up the slopes and rid themselves of Ferguson and his Loyalist militia in the only way they knew—by fighting to the bitter end.
Once Ferguson learned that the Overmountain men were coming for him, the hunter became the hunted. He faced a stark choice: stand and fight, or retreat to Cornwallis near Charlotte with the Back Country already in flame and no lasting advantage secured for the Crown on the frontier. After several days of intelligence, he chose to withdraw his inexperienced troops toward the main army. The march itself proved difficult. His men possessed little military training or discipline, and the result was a less-than-effective movement toward safety. Ferguson therefore sent repeated messages to Cornwallis requesting a relief force to cover the retreat. The requests reveal how little confidence he placed in his own command and how determined he was to bring the men back unscathed for future operations. He understood that a militia defeated early in its service was likely to scatter and never return to the King’s banner.
By the time Ferguson reached Kings Mountain—a position local Loyalists had recommended—he believed Cornwallis, only a day or two distant, already knew of his situation and was moving to his assistance. That belief was false. Many of Ferguson’s messengers had been captured by the Patriots, and other delays kept the full picture from reaching Cornwallis. Still, Ferguson settled on the mountain with the conviction that he could hold it for a few days until help arrived. He had three steep slopes for protection and roughly 150 Provincial troops armed with the bayonet to stiffen his raw militia. Opposite him, he saw only rag-tag militia who, in his judgment, could not launch a successful assault. If they did attack, he expected to hold until the main army—already, he thought, on the way—reached him.
After careful consideration, the following points offer the best explanation of why Ferguson acted as he did.
- Contempt for the rebels. As a career officer from a fairly prominent family, Ferguson almost certainly felt contempt and personal arrogance toward his enemy, especially the Overmountain men, whom he regarded as “Barbarians,” “the dregs of mankind,” “a set of mongrels,” and “banditti.” Those labels were a response to atrocities committed against local Loyalists. Given his prior experience, he probably did not respect their fighting ability or their speed as much as he should have.
- Timing. Ferguson appears to have believed he still possessed more space between himself and the enemy than he actually did. He never intended to fight a decisive battle at Kings Mountain; he chose the high, defensible ground merely as a temporary position in case he was attacked before reinforcements arrived. He did feel, however, that he could hold the ground if attacked. That calculation explains the complete absence of defensive construction. Ferguson was intelligent, well educated, experienced, and thoroughly trained in formal military strategy. His lack of preparation and of any carefully considered plan—not to mention reports of his amorous escapades the night before—suggests that he was caught completely by surprise.
- The location. As a trained and capable tactician, Ferguson understood the value of high ground. Yet if he had known an attack was imminent, he would almost certainly have chosen a position harder to surround and one that offered a clear line of escape. Given his expertise and interest in arms, it is difficult to believe he was unaware of the tendency of soldiers to fire high when shooting downhill. Perhaps he thought the terrain would favor his bayonet-equipped troops. After walking the ground, one is left with the impression that Ferguson judged the slopes too steep on three sides for an effective assault and that, if attacked, he would be protected by elevation and need only face an attack from a single direction. He also failed to foresee how ineffective a bayonet charge would prove on such steep, forested ground. A bayonet charge is nearly worthless unless coordinated, and it becomes disastrous if it fails to break the enemy. On that terrain, coordination and mutual support were all but impossible.
- Overconfidence in his own men. While Ferguson does not appear to have underestimated his opponents (otherwise he might have taken the offensive), he overestimated his own force—at least to the degree that he did not conduct himself as a commander preparing for a last stand.
- Failure to adapt once the battle began. Whether from arrogance, pride, or simple inflexibility, Ferguson, once surrounded and under assault, did not fight a purely defensive engagement—the approach that the terrain itself seemed to dictate. After the failed bayonet charges, a change in tactics would have been the sensible course. He also made no serious attempt to break out in force and retreat. Such an effort may not have succeeded, but it could scarcely have produced a worse result.
In sum, surprise attack placed Ferguson in an ultimately indefensible position, and the terrain itself exerted the greatest influence on the outcome. Though he was a well-respected and capable officer, his lack of preparation remains inexcusable. As a direct result of these events and of the decisions he made, Ferguson remains on Kings Mountain to this day.
A few questions remain open for further consideration:
- Was the top of the mountain simply too small to afford real protection? In other words, was the entire summit under fire from the encircling enemy? If it was not, could Ferguson have “circled the wagons”? (The next visit will include an experiment: placing a man in a red coat at the center of the summit to test visibility from every direction.)
- If Ferguson could have avoided fire from below and waited until the enemy reached the crest before firing or charging, might he have won—or at least held out for several days?
- Why was he so poorly informed about the position and intentions of the enemy? Was the failure rooted in arrogance or in incompetence?
