Battle of Stono Ferry

 The Battle of Stono Ferry

June 20, 1779 | A Rear-Guard Action on the Road Back to Savannah

Introduction

The Battle of Stono Ferry, fought on June 20, 1779, is one of those Revolutionary War engagements that deserves more attention than it usually receives. South Carolina’s story of the Revolution is often told through two dramatic events: the defense of the palmetto-log fort on Sullivan’s Island in 1776 and the fall of Charleston in 1780. Between those two events came a hard-fought campaign that brought the British close to Charleston and ended in a sharp fight at Stono Ferry.

The victory at Sullivan’s Island on June 28, 1776, helped establish William Moultrie and others as heroes of the Patriot cause. It is commemorated each year as Carolina Day. Four years later, Charleston surrendered to the British on May 12, 1780, in a disaster for the American cause in the South. General Benjamin Lincoln’s army was captured, and the British gained a powerful base for their campaign through the Southern states. The Battle of Stono Ferry belongs to the middle of this story. It did not decide the war, but it shows how close Charleston came to danger in 1779—and how difficult it was for either side to control the Lowcountry’s rivers, marshes, roads, and islands.

Stono Ferry was not a separate ‘second Battle of Charleston’ in the same sense as the major 1776 and 1780 events. Rather, it was the climax of a British expedition against Charleston in the spring of 1779 and a rear-guard action fought as that expedition withdrew. To understand the battle, we must first look at why the British came to South Carolina and why their return to Savannah became such a challenge.

Prevost’s March on Charleston

After capturing Savannah in December 1778, the British looked for ways to extend their control in the South. General Augustine Prevost, commanding British forces in Georgia, saw an opportunity in the spring of 1779. General Benjamin Lincoln, commander of the Continental forces in the Southern Department, had moved much of his army toward Augusta and the Georgia backcountry in an effort to bring that region under American control. Charleston, meanwhile, was left with a much thinner defense, relying on General William Moultrie, a limited number of Continental troops, and local militia.

Prevost crossed into South Carolina and advanced toward Charleston. His movement put pressure on the city and forced the Americans to reconsider their priorities. Prevost’s expedition was bold, but the Lowcountry was not easy country for an army. Heat, swamps, creeks, long distances, and the need to find provisions slowed the British advance. His troops reached the outskirts of Charleston—often described as coming within about seven miles of the town—but Prevost lacked the heavy siege equipment needed for a formal assault and knew that Lincoln’s force might return.

Prevost attempted to obtain Charleston’s submission without storming the city. The negotiations and debate inside Charleston have been interpreted in different ways: some accounts emphasize discussion of accommodation or neutrality, while others regard the exchange as an effort to gain time. What is clear is that Charleston’s leaders were divided over how to respond, and Moultrie opposed yielding the city. The approach of Lincoln’s army changed the calculation. Rather than risk being trapped between Charleston’s defenders and Lincoln’s returning force, Prevost withdrew from the immediate vicinity of the city in May 1779.

That decision did not mean the British could simply march back to Savannah by the same route. Their advance had consumed or requisitioned supplies along the way, and Lincoln’s army, joined by growing Patriot activity, threatened their line of retreat. A major battle on the mainland could endanger the British expedition and weaken their position in Georgia. Prevost therefore chose a route through the Sea Islands, using waterways and Royal Navy transport to move troops south. It was a daring retreat, but it gave the British an important advantage: the rivers and inlets could become defensive barriers, while naval craft could help move and support the army.

Why Stono Ferry Mattered

Stono Ferry became the key point on the mainland side of the crossing between the Charleston area and John’s Island. To withdraw by water, the British needed to protect the landing while men, baggage, horses, and the sick were ferried away. The position also offered a point from which to resist an American attack and, potentially, to gather supplies or support from local Loyalists.

Prevost left a rear guard at Stono Ferry under Lieutenant Colonel John Maitland of the 71st Regiment of Foot, commonly known as Fraser’s Highlanders. Estimates put the garrison at roughly 800 to 900 men. It included elements of the 71st Highlanders, Hessian troops, the Royal North Carolina Regiment and other Loyalist forces, artillery, and support from an armed British naval craft on the Stono River. Accounts vary in the exact composition and number of guns, but the purpose of the force is clear: Maitland was to hold the crossing long enough for the main British force to get away.

Maitland strengthened the position with three redoubts—small enclosed defensive works—and an abatis, a barrier of felled trees with sharpened branches facing outward. Artillery covered approaches to the works, while marshes, creeks, and narrow causeways made it difficult for an attacking force to deploy. In the Lowcountry, the terrain could be as formidable as the enemy. Pluff mud, tidal creeks, and swampy ground could slow troops, break up formations, and turn a planned advance into confusion.

The British were not seeking a general engagement. Their mission was to hold the landing while the rest of the army withdrew. For Lincoln, however, Stono Ferry offered a chance to strike a separated British force before the entire expedition escaped. If he could capture or destroy Maitland’s bridgehead, the British retreat would become more dangerous and their position in Georgia more vulnerable.

Lincoln’s Plan

By mid-June, Lincoln decided to move against the British position. He brought a force of about 1,200 men toward Stono Ferry, including Continental troops, militia from the Carolinas and Virginia, cavalry, and Count Casimir Pulaski’s Legion. The American force was smaller than Lincoln’s full army, but he hoped to use surprise and coordination to overcome Maitland’s defenses.

Lincoln planned a two-part operation. He would lead the main attack against Stono Ferry, while Moultrie took a separate force from Charleston toward James Island. Moultrie’s movement was intended as a diversion: if the British believed that the main threat was coming from the island side, they might be prevented from sending reinforcements to Maitland. The plan depended on Moultrie getting enough men across the waterways in time.

That part of the plan failed. Moultrie did not have enough boats to move his men across in the numbers needed, and the diversion did not develop as Lincoln had hoped. This left Maitland freer to concentrate on the attack at Stono Ferry and to call for help from the main British force on John’s Island. Lincoln’s main column, however, was already on the move.

The Battle Begins

On the morning of June 20, 1779, after a night march of roughly eight miles, Lincoln’s men approached the British works. The British pickets gave warning at about 7 a.m. The Americans advanced against a position that was stronger than they had anticipated, protected by redoubts, artillery, an abatis, and difficult ground. An armed British vessel in the river added fire support to the defenders.

The fighting began with the American attack pressing toward the British line. On one side, American troops pushed against the Hessian-held portion of the position; elsewhere, Continental troops and militia tried to advance against the redoubts. The terrain disrupted the assault. A marshy creek and the narrow approaches prevented some Americans from reaching their intended positions as quickly as planned. Meanwhile, British artillery and musket fire checked the advance, and the defenders shifted troops to strengthen threatened areas.

For a time, the American attack made progress, and the British left was pressed hard. The 71st Highlanders moved to shore up the line, helping the Hessians recover and renewing the fight. The action was intense but short. Lincoln’s men were facing prepared defenses, and their field pieces could do little against the redoubts. Just as important, British reinforcements began arriving from John’s Island. The very crossing Maitland had been ordered to protect was now allowing the main British force to reinforce him.

The battle lasted roughly an hour. Seeing that the position was not being carried and that reinforcements were reaching the British, Lincoln ordered a withdrawal. The Americans began to pull back, taking their wounded and artillery with them. The retreat was not without danger: Maitland sent troops out from the works to pursue the withdrawing Americans, and the American mounted troops, including Pulaski’s cavalry, helped cover the withdrawal and discourage a more damaging pursuit.

The fighting at Stono Ferry was therefore neither a prolonged siege nor a decisive destruction of one army by the other. It was a sharp assault on a prepared rear guard. The Americans failed to take the position, while the British successfully held the crossing long enough to protect their withdrawal.

Casualties and the Outcome

Casualty figures vary among accounts, in part because the American returns included a large number of men reported missing. One commonly cited American return lists 30 killed, 116 wounded, and 155 missing; the British reported 26 killed, 93 wounded, and one missing. Other summaries group the American killed and wounded differently, giving totals around 146 or 150 before the missing are counted. The missing should not automatically be treated as prisoners: some accounts suggest that men separated from their units or deserted during the withdrawal were included in that figure. The numbers should therefore be presented as reported returns, not as perfectly settled totals.

The British had won the battlefield, but the victory did not reverse the strategic situation that had brought them to Stono Ferry. Three days later, on June 23, the British abandoned the position and moved the remaining force toward Beaufort and Port Royal Island. Prevost’s main body continued its difficult withdrawal toward Savannah. The British had avoided the destruction of the rear guard and kept their army intact, but they had not captured Charleston.

The consequences reached beyond the immediate fight. Prevost’s expedition had shown the British how difficult it would be to operate in the Lowcountry, but it also provided information about the approaches to Charleston, the roads, and the terrain south of the city. That experience would matter when British forces returned in greater strength in 1780. The following year’s campaign culminated in the siege and surrender of Charleston on May 12, 1780, under General Sir Henry Clinton and Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot—not in a battle commanded by Prevost. The loss of Lincoln’s army was a major disaster for the American cause in the South.

The same British forces that escaped the Charleston expedition also remained a threat to the Patriot position in Georgia. In September and October 1779, French and American forces attempted to retake Savannah and were defeated. Stono Ferry did not, by itself, decide the outcome at Savannah, but it formed part of the chain of events that allowed the British to withdraw, regroup, and continue defending their southern foothold.

Why Stono Ferry Deserves to Be Remembered

The Battle of Stono Ferry does not have the simple heroic image of the palmetto fort at Sullivan’s Island, nor the sweeping consequences of Charleston’s surrender in 1780. Its importance lies in the difficult decisions and close calls that shaped the Southern campaign. Prevost’s march nearly placed Charleston in immediate danger. Lincoln’s return prevented the British from pressing the opportunity further, while the terrain and waterways offered Prevost a way to save his army. At Stono Ferry, Lincoln attempted to punish that withdrawal and failed to break through Maitland’s defenses.

The result was a British tactical victory and an American failure to destroy the rear guard—but also an incomplete British success. Charleston remained out of British hands in 1779, and Prevost’s expedition withdrew. The battle reminds us that Revolutionary War campaigns were not fought only on famous fields. They also depended on ferries, causeways, marshes, boats, provisions, and the ability to move an army through unfamiliar country without losing it.

The campaign-route map at the end of this article helps bring this story into focus. Follow Prevost’s advance toward Charleston, then trace the British withdrawal by way of the Sea Islands toward Beaufort. The map also shows Lincoln’s hurried return from Augusta and his later march from Charleston to Stono Ferry. These routes make clear why the ferry mattered: it was a narrow but critical doorway between the mainland and the island route south.

Principal Forces at Stono Ferry

American: Major General Benjamin Lincoln led an assault force of approximately 1,200 men drawn from Continental units and militia, with cavalry and artillery support. Brigadier Generals Jethro Sumner and Isaac Huger commanded major elements of the attack; Count Casimir Pulaski’s Legion helped cover the withdrawal.

British and Loyalist: Lieutenant Colonel John Maitland commanded approximately 800–900 men, including the 71st Regiment of Foot (Fraser’s Highlanders), Hessian troops, the Royal North Carolina Regiment and other Loyalist forces, artillery, and support from an armed naval craft on the Stono River. Exact unit counts and dispositions vary across published accounts.

Figure 1. Campaign routes, 1779. The map traces Prevost’s advance from Savannah to Charleston, Lincoln’s return from Augusta and later march to Stono Ferry, and the British withdrawal through the Sea Islands toward Beaufort. The separate dotted route marks Prevost’s own onward journey by sea to Savannah.