The Battle of Stono Ferry Part III: The Conclusion

On the morning of June 20th General Lincoln was now set to attack the British works protecting the Stono Ferry with the Southern Continental Army. His two prong plan of attack using General Moultrie as a diversion on James Island is sound to keep the attention of the main British force from coming to the aid of the troops at the Stono Ferry while he attacks with the main force. His pickets and skirmishers are already in contact the with their British counter parts taking shots at each other and he is ready to begin the attack at 7AM. On the British side they know that the Americans are camped not to far away and they are waiting for a possible attack, they are not surprised when the Americans start to advance towards them. They were however caught in an interesting situation, with the main part of their army on Johns Island with the rest still holding the position on the Stono Ferry. Remember Prevost was trying to get back to Savannah with his army in tack and this was his most vulnerable point on the way back. So he was hoping to avoid a fight but had set his defenses up to give him the most effective defense with the least amount of troops. He also had a British Navy barge armed with heavy cannons on his left flank in the Stono River to add to his defenses.

With these two enemey armies in the initial phase of combat the American attack was dealt a major blow to its efforts without General Lincoln realizing it. General Moultrie and his diversionary force of militia had not crossed in significant numbers onto James Island because of a shortage of boats and as a result General Moultrie called of his diversion. This allowed the British to have their main army ready to reinforce the troops at Stono Ferry, because they were not threatened elsewhere once the American attack was known to be in full force at the Stone bridge head.



General Lincoln started his attack without knowing his diversion from General Moultrie was not happening. He sent his North Carolina militia to attack the Hessians on the British left flank and his Continentals from North and South Carolina to attack the British right flanks which were both guarded by cannon fortified redoubts. As they moved towards their objectives the attack started to gain steam as they started to push the British pickets back to the fortifications. However the attack on the British right by the Continentals was halted almost immediately, not by the British fire but by a marsh creek that was unknown to the Americans. For those who don’t live in the Low Country these marsh creeks are filled with pluff mud that’s like quick sand and water mixture. Once the Continentals reach this marsh creek it stopped their part of the attack instantly. On the British left flank the North Carolina militia was making head ways against the Hessians stationed there until the British barge on the Stono River started to open fire along with members of the 71st who were sent to that section to help secure their flank.



Once the attack was going the British started to send reinforcements back across the Stono River as fast as the boats could take them. The British started to rush down the cause way to get to the boats that were stationed there. General Lincoln saw that he was not making head way and that the British reinforcements were already crossing back across the river, so he called off the attack after only 55 minutes. He ordered a retreat back away from the battle field to be covered by his reserve force of Brigadier General Count Kazimierz Pulaski and his Legion along with Andrew Pickens and his upstate militia which had not been deployed in the battle. This was a good thing because the 71st sallied out towards the retreating Americans and was driven back by Count Pulaski and his force as the main force retreated towards their camps.



In the after math of the battle it was learned that out of the 900 originally deployed by Prevost 26 were killed and 163 wounded. Lincoln’s force of 1200 reported 146 killed/wounded and 150 men missing or captured after the battle in reports. These numbers are not great, but the battle won by the British allowed them to evacuate the Stono Ferry bridge head three days later with no more loss of life and to make their way to Savannah without further inference from the Americans.



The result of this battle was that South Carolina was still free of British troops near Charleston, but the British army which was out in the open and vulnerable was allowed to escape back to Savannah and its defenses. If the Americans would have been able to defeat this British force it would of been a major blow to Prevost and his army’s chances of holding Georgia. Instead as the future would show this Prevost and his army that made it back to Savannah would play a major role in the defeat of the combined French/American force that attacks Savannah and in the final attack on Charleston.

Below is a map of the South Carolina and Georgia's coast line and the roads system from around the time of the Revolution. By looking at it you can see the trail Prevost used to get to Charleston and his escape route using the coast and the sea islands to make his way back to Savannah.

Battle of Stono Ferry Part Two

As we left off last time, General Prevost has decided to move his British troop back to Savannah using the Sea Islands as protection since the Royal Navy controls these waters and so that he can move his troops through areas where they can find supplies. To accomplish this, he first selected the Stono Ferry as his main land disembark point to start his plan of island hopping back to Savannah. From the Stono Ferry he was shipping his troops across from the river from main land to John’s Island. So this is the point where he needed to protect his beach head the most. This was the one spot where the Continentals could attack him without having to chase him from island to island. Also this point gave him an avenue to allow any Tories to join his ranks and to forage if possible.


To accomplish this goal, he built a position guarding the ferry. This included three redoubts with cannons, an abates all along the perimeter of fallen trees with the limbs and points sticking out to slowing the enemy advancing, and around 900 men under the command of Lt. Col John Maitland of the 71st Regiment of Foot (Frasier’s Highlanders). With Lt. Col Maitland at Stono Ferry he had his First battalion of the 71st, a detachment of Royal Artillery, a detachment of Hesse Kassel Regiment (Hessians), the Royal North Carolina Regiment (Provincial Unit), a royal navy barge, and South Carolina Tory Militia. Their job to hold the ferry landing on the Charleston side until the main British force had made its way across Johns Island. They were not looking for a fight since the main bulk had already crossed the river and they were exposed until they got across the Stono also.

The date that started the British retreat from Charleston back to Savannah was May the 12th when the bluff was up and Prevost decided the time was right to leave. Some time on June the 12th General Lincoln decided it was time to follow the British with his full Continental Army. Charleston was secure from the British attack and this was his chance to attack them with a superior force. To accomplish this he decided on a two prong attack. The first prong was to be himself with the 4rth North Carolina, the 5th North Carolina, the 4rth South Carolina (Artillery), North Carolina Militia, the Sixth South Carolina, the 3rd South Carolina (Rangers), the 1st Georgia, the 2nd Georgia, the 3rd Georgia, the 4rth Georgia, South Carolina Militia, Count Pulaski’s Legion, North Carolina Dragoons, South Carolina Dragoons, South Carolina Militia, and Virginia Militia. This main force was to proceed directly from Charleston down the Jacksonboro Road to Stono Ferry and attack the British position there. While he was doing that General Moultrie of the first attack of Charleston fame was to take a mixture of militia and some Continental troops from the garrison of Charleston and move across the Wappoo River to James Island. Once on James Island he was to make a demonstration to catch the main British forces attention while he attacked the exposed force on the main land. The big problem for this was that he needed to cross the river before the attack was to begin to accomplish this diversion of the main British force, which as events pan out he does not accomplish.

On the morning of June 20th almost six weeks since Prevost asked Charleston to surrender, General Lincoln had forced marched his army 8 miles and was now ready to attack the Stono Ferry with his main force.  The British force was behind its defensive works and readying its self for the American attack. This sets the stage for part three of the Battle of Stono Ferry which will be up next week.


The American Forces at the Battle of Stono Ferry


Commanding
Brig. General Benjamin Lincoln

Right wing of Attack
Commander Brig. General Jethro Sumner of North Carolina

4th North Carolina
Hillsborough District Militia NC
4th SC Artillery detachment

Left Wing of Attack
Commander Brig. General Isaac Huger

1st South Carolina
3rd South Carolina
4rth SC Artillery detachement
6th South Carolina
1st Brigade of South Carolina Militia
2nd Brigade of South Carolina Militia
3rd Brigade of South Carolina Militia
4rth Brigade of South Carolina Militia

Reserve:
Commander Brig General Count Pulaski

Pulaski’s Legion
South Carolina Light Dragoons
Lower Ninty six District regiment
Virginia Militia
Catawba Indian Company
Virginia Militia Artillery

Flags of the Hesse Kassel and 71st Regiments

The Battle of Stono Ferry June 20th, 1779 Part 1

         The Battle of Stono Ferry is an end result of the second battle of Charleston. The second battle of Charleston has not drawn much attention as the first Battle of Charleston with the heroic siege of the fort built out of palmetto logs has in history with names such as Marion, Jasper, and Moultrie that now grace the history books. The story of the heroic little fort standing up to the might of the British army and navy during the first battle of Charleston and thus giving the United States even before the Declaration of Independence was signed their first great victory against the British. This historic victory is still celebrated in South Carolina unofficially as Carolina Day in Charleston with a parade and other events. The third battle of Charleston was one of sorrow and disgrace as the entire American army of the South under the leadership of General Lincoln surrendered to Cornwallis and his army without honor. This third battle stripped the South of any Continentals until Gates came South for his ill fated battle at Camden. Of course this battle did allow South Carolina’s heroes such as Marion, Pickens, and Sumter to come to center stage, which is a discussion for a different day.




       The Battle of Stono Ferry was basically a major rear guard action as the British General Prevost was heading back to Savannah after his failed attempt to bluff Charleston into surrendering which almost worked. While General Lincoln and the Southern Continental Army were near Augusta trying to bring that area into Continental control Prevost saw an opportunity to relieve the pressure on Augusta by driving his force into South Carolina from his base in Savannah and towards Charleston. His thoughts were that once Lincoln saw this threat he would leave his Augusta operations and race back to Charleston for its defenses which were very light consisting primarily of General Moultrie with a few Continentals and local militia. On this initial feint against Charleston to relieve pressure on Augusta, Prevost came to a realization on the march. Lincoln was not doing as expected; instead he was staying around Augusta and not racing back to Charleston. This lack of interest by Lincoln gave Prevost a great opportunity if he was daring enough to take it. The opportunity was to take Charleston while the primary defense force was too far away to assist. To Prevost credit, he took the chance and started to race towards Charleston with all speed capturing other smaller ports such as Beaufort and Port Royal along the way. Once at the gates of Charleston with no siege equipment or significant forces to storm Charleston, General Prevost did what had gotten him to the gates of Charleston, he tried to bluff the city into surrender. Sadly enough this almost worked since the city leaders were willing to put Charleston into a sort of neutrality until the war of Independence was decided. This has been debated by many as either this was a ruse to stall for Lincoln and his force to raise the siege or a real proposal for neutrality to save the business of Charleston. The bottom line is that the debate inside the walls was real and heated between the local government and General Moultrie the hero of the first battle of Charleston to decide the fate of the city. The good news was that the decision was made for them once General Lincoln and his army started to race towards the relief of Charleston. This was the result of Lincoln finally and almost too late to rescue the crown jewel of the South from British control. So after two days Prevost lifted the siege and decided to return to Savannah with his army in tow. The only question now was how he was going to accomplish this. He had two main ways to accomplish this, the first was to return the way he had come or by the islands that dot the coast of South Carolina and Georgia all the way to Savannah. There were two problems that caused him to not choose the first option. The first was the Continental army which was now bearing down on him with the militia turning out in force to extract him and his force out of South Carolina by force of battle. Prevost could not risk losing his army in a major battle because as a result Savannah would be lost back to the Americans and the British Southern strategy would be lost. The other problem was that on the way from Savannah to Charleston he had stripped the land he passed of food and material to keep his army moving towards Charleston. On the way back this way he would have little food stuffs to feed his army since they had just travelled this way. So the choice he made was a daring one, he would retreat back to Savannah with his army via the coastal islands using the water ways as a means to transport his troops through as General MacArthur during World War Two would refer to as “island hoping”. The second result of this route was that he could use the water ways as defensive positions to help keep the American Army in check since they did not have any real navel support as he to interfere with the crossings. The other advantage of this move was that it allowed the Royal Navy to help keep him supplied and protected. Thus we are now at the battle of Stono Ferry.

Sir Banastre Tarleton at Cowpens

While doing some research on the Battle of Cowpens, one of the things that struck me as a big factor was the mental and physical state of Tarleton's men prior to the battle. They had been chasing Morgan for weeks. They were probably suffering from exhaustion, hunger and the stress of facing mortal combat at the end of it all.




The question that came to mind was "why didn't Tarleton rest and feed his men prior to the battle?" I know I'm not the first to ask this question, but it strikes me as vitally important.



My first thought was that Tarleton, being a rash glory hound, didn't give thought to, nor care about the physical and mental state of his men. That he was so overconfident in his men that he could push them as hard as possible and still expect them to easily defeat the emeny. Also, he was so eager that he gave little thought to tactics, either his or Morgan's, but simply wanted to rush toward victory and glory..



However, after further research on "Bloody Ban", I have a different view on his actions. I think, given his success at other places, especially Waxhaws, Tarleton thought a straight foward assault gave him the best chance to win. There are some similarities between the two battles. At Waxhaws, Tarleton was chasing an enemy that wasn't looking for an open battle. At Waxhaws, his speed led to them catching the enemy before they had time to prepare properly. Even though it wasn't a surprise attack (he had sent a letter offering to let Buford surrender), Tarleton's speed, and Buford's incompetence, led to him catching the enemy unprepared and vulnerable to a straight forward cavalry charge. So Tarleton's speed and brashness had paid off in the past.



At Cowpens, Tarleton had to believe he had the advantage. After all, he was the one pursuing a fleeing enemy. Perhaps when he heard Morgan was preparing for battle he simply thought they were desperate and had no choice but to fight (this was true). Perhaps he also surmised that his troops were so much better that a quick charge would have the same results as Waxhaws (this was not true).



Another factor could have been psychological. Tarleton probably knew that the only thing that moved faster than his men was his reputation. He may have thought that waiting for his troops to rest and eat breakfast would have been sending the wrong message to his men and his enemy. This could be seen as showing weakness.



Also, this was the largest command he ever had and the first time he was the supreme commander at a large battle. He was didn't have much experience in tactical movements on the battlefield. His tactics were to hit first, hit hard, and overwhelm the enemy.



Of course, it turns out that Tarleton did underestimate his enemy. Morgan wasn't Buford. Morgan took the time to devise a well thought out strategy to counter Tarleton's attack. With the clarity of hindsight, Tarleton would have been better served to take the extra time to rest and feed his men, but he was young, successful and invincible, so caution wasn't a quality he possessed. Besides, it went against his nature. He was a gambler and trusted his luck and ability.



I think Tarleton has gotten too much bad press from American historians. Many of his "atrocities" have been accepted as fact, even though there is little evidence to support them. I think that if you judge him by the standards of the day, and from an unbiased viewpoint, he was no worse than most of his peers. For instance, based on the statistics, "Tarleton's Quarter" is more myth and propaganda than reality, but that is a topic for further discussion.



Tarleton's decision to rush into battle was based on his past successes, his underestimation of his enemy, and his inexperience dealing with a force like the one waiting for him at Cowpens and a leader like Daniel Morgan. I don't think it was just sheer cockiness or stupidity. After all, the battle could (and almost did) go in a very different direction, resulting in a disastrous defeat for the Americans.

Patriot Forces at Kings Mountain

The forces that were at the bottom of Kings Mountain were from North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and present day Tennessee, also referred to as the Watauga Settlements. When Ferguson went towards the far reaching parts of South Carolina he was doing so to show the residents of the area that England was still in control of the Royal Colony and they were its total masters. The main area he wanted to make sure that they understood the Royal Goverment was in control were the settelers over the Mountains. The problem was that Ferguson did either not understand the settlers of the Watauga Settlements or totally looked down at them. They were a proud people who were use to fighting to stay alive against the Cherokee and other Indian Nations in the West at this time. Once Ferguson told them he was going to cross the mountains and burn their towns and hang their leaders it was in fact a declaration of war against these people who were already fighting natives on a constant basis. These same people already had established an almost self sufficient government already. They had done this because they were breaking English law by settling across the mountains which was in direct violation of the Proclamation of 1763 which forbid settlements across the mountains, because of treaties with the Native Tribes. They never expected the British to come to their aid against the natives, but they expected to be left alone since they provided a barrier against raids into the colonies proper why they were between the Royal Colonies and the Natives. So by Ferguson calling them to come to the aid of the Crown caused a reaction he was not ready for. Instead of coming to the Crowns aid or at least staying neutral out of fear of Royal troops coming to ruin them, they decided to do what came naturally to them, which was to fight to protect their lives and homes. Once they decided to fight they gathered their men in the Watauga Settlements and left half to protect against Natives and the other half started towards Ferguson to let him know he would not push them around or cause them to bow to the Crown. As they gathered at Sycamore Shoals to make the journey to fight Ferguson they sent riders into the Carolinas and Virginia to notify them of their plans to fight Ferguson and to come to their assistance, and they did. As they traveled south to intercept Ferguson their numbers grow until at the bottom of Kings Mountain they were ready to Charge up the sides of it and rid themselves of the threat of Ferguson and his Loyalist Militia the only way they knew how, by fighting till the bitter end.

The Overmountain men gathering at Sycamore Shoals

Why Ferguson fought at Kings Mountain

     When Ferguson put out his decree to the Overmountain Men it was one of those moments of history that changed everything. By doing this he did the one thing that Clinton and Cornwallis did not want him to do, he set the Back Country in flame against the Crown. This flame burned so bright and fierce that the population rose up against Ferguson and his Loyalist militia with a vengeance of being insulted. Once Ferguson learned that the Overmountain Men were coming for him the hunter became the hunted and Ferguson had to make a decision to stand and fight or retreat back to Cornwallis with the Back Country in Flame and no advantage for the Crown secured on the frontier. After several days of intelligence coming to Ferguson he chooses to take his inexperienced troops back to Cornwallis near Charlotte. On his retreat from the back country he was dealing with inexperienced men on the march who had little if any military training or discipline. This resulted in a less than effective march to safety. As a result, Ferguson sent messages to Cornwallis asking for him to send him a relief force to help cover his retreat back to Cormwallis. This shows how inexperienced Ferguson felt his men were and that he wanted to get the men back unscathed if possible to save them for future operations. If like other militia they suffered a defeat early in service they would run and never return to the Kings banner.


Thus when Ferguson got to Kings Mountain he felt that Cornwallis who was a day or two away knew of his situation and request for immediate assistance. This was not true since Cornwallis did not have all of the messages that Ferguson had sent because of messengers being captured by patriots and other events that caused delays in their delivery. So once on Kings Mountain which local Loyalist had told him about, Ferguson felt he had a position he could hold for a few days till help arrived from the main army that he felt sure was already on the way to him.

Once on top of the mountain, he had three steep slopes for protection and 150 Provincial troops with the bayonet to help bolster his raw militia. He was against some rag tag militia who he felt could not launch a successful attack on his position and if they did attack  he could hold out until help arrived which he felt was near and on the way to his aid.

As a result of these events and the decisions of Ferguson, he is still on Kings Mountain today.

   

Fergusons Proclamation to the "Overmountain" men

'Overmountain' men to desist from rebellion or he would bring fire and sword down upon them, and hang their leaders. This proclamation triggers a reaction that cost Ferguson his command and his life.

Ferguson at Kings Mountain

By Lazarus

After careful consideration I have come up with my best guess as to why Ferguson acted as he did (in no particular order).


1. Contempt for the rebels. As a career officer from a fairly prominent family Ferguson probably felt contempt and personal arrogance towards his enemy, (esp. the overmountain men) whom he regarded as "Barbarians", "the dregs of mankind", "a set of mongrels" and "banditti". This is in response to atrocities committed on local loyalists. Given his prior experience, he probably didn't respect their fighting ability or speed as much as he should.

(see #4)
2. Timing. It seems that Ferguson thought he had more space between himself and the enemy. I believe that he never intended to fight at King's Mountain, but he chose the high, defensible, location in case he was attacked before reinforcements arrived. Although he did feel he could hold the position if attacked.


This would explain the lack of any defensive construction. Ferguson was very smart, well educated, experienced and had years of formal military training in strategy. His lack of preparation or a well thought out strategy (not to mention his reportedly amorous escapades the night before) leads me to believe he was caught completely by surprise.

3. The location. As a trained and capable tactician, Ferguson would understand the importance of the high ground in a defensive position. However, I think if he knew he would be attacked he would have chosen a spot that was harder to surround and had a way of escape. Also, given his ability and interest in arms, I find it hard to believe that he would not have known the tendency of shooting too high when facing an enemy from higher ground. Perhaps he thought that the terrain would help his bayonet equipped troops.

After seeing the battlefield, I think Ferguson felt that the land was too steep (on three sides) for an enemy to effectively assault and that if he was attacked he would be protected by the elevation and would only have to defend an assault from one direction.

Finally, Ferguson probably couldn't foresee how ineffective a bayonet charge would be on such steep, forested terrain. A bayonet charge is pretty worthless if it isn't coordinated and is disastrous if it doesn't "break" the enemy. Given the terrain, coordination and support for a charge seems impossible.

4. Overconfidence in his men. While I don't feel Ferguson underestimated his opponents (else he might have been on the offensive), I do feel he overestimated his force at least to the point where he didn't act like he was about to make his "last stand" (see #3).

5. Failure to adapt during the battle. Whether it was arrogance, pride, or inflexibility, once he was surrounded and assaulted, Ferguson didn't fight a defensive engagement, which would seem to be the most sensible given the terrain. I would think that after the failed bayonet charge he would have considered a change in tactics. Also, Ferguson did not try to "break out" in force and retreat. This may not have been possible, but it couldn't have been any worse.

To sum it up, I think Ferguson being attacked with surprise lead to his indefensible defensive position and that the terrain probably had the biggest impact on the battle.

While a well respected and capable officer, Ferguson's lack of preparation is inexcusable.

A few questions for you:

1. Was the top of the mountain too small to afford protection to Ferguson's men? i.e. was the entire mountain top under fire from the encircling enemy? If is wasn't, could Ferguson "circled the wagons"? (the next time I'm there I'm going to send someone to the center of the top with a red coat and see if the are visible from every direction)

2. If he could have avoided fire from below and waited for the enemy to reach the top before firing or charging, could he have won? Or at least held out for a few days?

3. Why wasn't he more informed on the position and intentions of the enemy. Is this arrogance or incompetence?
 

A Study of Ferguson at Kings Mountain

      Just a quick update, we have decided to work on why Ferguson chose Kings Mountain to make his last stand. We are going to look at the troops he had at his disposal, his troop’s weapons, the experience of the troops, and the defensive position of His Majesties Loyal forces. Once we have looked at these issues, we will then look at possible military protocol, Fergusons military training, and how the Patriots advancing on him effected his decision that caused his entire force to be lost to the rugged “Over the Mountain Boys”.