General Moultrie's Lost Fort

Most people know the story of General Moultrie’s fort on Sullivan's Island that was named for him after he lead the forts defense against the British on June 28^th in  1776. This fort becomes the symbol of resistance in Charlestown against the crown after its walls of palmetto logs were able to with stand the bombardment of the British Navy and Col. Thomson at the other end of Sullivan's Island was able to keep the British troops on Long Island (Isle of Palms) from crossing Breech Inlet and attacking the fort by land.

General Moultrie’s forgotten fortification can be found in Dorchester County on the Ashley River. This is the earth redoubt that he built to guard the access to Charlestown near Summerville, SC. This was an important crossroad for the defense of Charlestown 28 miles up the Ashley River. This was the bridge that leads across the Ashley River to White House Meeting House named in the honor of Reverend White, which the British burned under General Provost during his raid against Charlestown in 1778 and to Dorchester Road which was the main road leading directly to Charlestown. This fortification was built between January and February of 1780 to block any British advance coming up from Savannah that were going to link up with the British General Clinton who had landed on Johns Island and was already moving his forces to James Island under the protection of the Royal Navies big guns.  At this fortification he had over 300 hundred horseman that were used as a reconnaissance force and or a rapid response force should the British appear at other crossings to impede their crossings. This cavalry force was composed of the 1st Continental Dragoons under the command of Lt. Col. Anthony White and the 3rd Continental Dragoons under the command of Lt. Col. William Washington, Col. Daniel Horry’s South Carolina Light Dragoons and other mounted troops from the local militia and unattached cavalry. This group of cavalry was put to good use in late March of 1780 by checking a British Calvary force consisting primarily of the British Legion and the 17^th Light horse under the command of Col. Tarlton who had yet to earn his American nickname Bloody Tarleton.  The infantry force was composed of the 2^nd South Carolina with around 250 men who defended the palmetto fort on Sullivan’s under Moultrie’s command in 1776 and whom at this time were under the direct command of his second in command at Fort Moultrie, Francis Marion. Marion’s other role at Bacon's Bridge was to form the local militia from the surrounding parishes and have them ready to defend Charlestown. This was no easy task because the locals were in fear of the British burning their homes while they were away.

Once General Lincoln, who was in total command of the defenses of Charlestown realized the British planned to cross at Stono Ferry he began to pull all his available forces to Charlestown proper  and General Moultrie’s position on the Ashley River was abandoned as his forces reported to Charlestown.  

This did not end the importance of this site since Marion would returned under the command of General Lincoln as a General in the South Carolina Militia and with a well earned nickname “The Swamp Fox”. Marion would come back to the site several times to check possible British advances or passing through to other areas of operations.

Today the spot where the fortification was located has been located and is now in the process of being protected for future generations so they won’t forget Moultrie’s lost fort as previous generations have.

Sir Banastre Tarleton at Cowpens

While doing some research on the Battle of Cowpens, one of the things that struck me as a big factor was the mental and physical state of Tarleton's men prior to the battle. They had been chasing Morgan for weeks. They were probably suffering from exhaustion, hunger and the stress of facing mortal combat at the end of it all.




The question that came to mind was "why didn't Tarleton rest and feed his men prior to the battle?" I know I'm not the first to ask this question, but it strikes me as vitally important.



My first thought was that Tarleton, being a rash glory hound, didn't give thought to, nor care about the physical and mental state of his men. That he was so overconfident in his men that he could push them as hard as possible and still expect them to easily defeat the emeny. Also, he was so eager that he gave little thought to tactics, either his or Morgan's, but simply wanted to rush toward victory and glory..



However, after further research on "Bloody Ban", I have a different view on his actions. I think, given his success at other places, especially Waxhaws, Tarleton thought a straight foward assault gave him the best chance to win. There are some similarities between the two battles. At Waxhaws, Tarleton was chasing an enemy that wasn't looking for an open battle. At Waxhaws, his speed led to them catching the enemy before they had time to prepare properly. Even though it wasn't a surprise attack (he had sent a letter offering to let Buford surrender), Tarleton's speed, and Buford's incompetence, led to him catching the enemy unprepared and vulnerable to a straight forward cavalry charge. So Tarleton's speed and brashness had paid off in the past.



At Cowpens, Tarleton had to believe he had the advantage. After all, he was the one pursuing a fleeing enemy. Perhaps when he heard Morgan was preparing for battle he simply thought they were desperate and had no choice but to fight (this was true). Perhaps he also surmised that his troops were so much better that a quick charge would have the same results as Waxhaws (this was not true).



Another factor could have been psychological. Tarleton probably knew that the only thing that moved faster than his men was his reputation. He may have thought that waiting for his troops to rest and eat breakfast would have been sending the wrong message to his men and his enemy. This could be seen as showing weakness.



Also, this was the largest command he ever had and the first time he was the supreme commander at a large battle. He was didn't have much experience in tactical movements on the battlefield. His tactics were to hit first, hit hard, and overwhelm the enemy.



Of course, it turns out that Tarleton did underestimate his enemy. Morgan wasn't Buford. Morgan took the time to devise a well thought out strategy to counter Tarleton's attack. With the clarity of hindsight, Tarleton would have been better served to take the extra time to rest and feed his men, but he was young, successful and invincible, so caution wasn't a quality he possessed. Besides, it went against his nature. He was a gambler and trusted his luck and ability.



I think Tarleton has gotten too much bad press from American historians. Many of his "atrocities" have been accepted as fact, even though there is little evidence to support them. I think that if you judge him by the standards of the day, and from an unbiased viewpoint, he was no worse than most of his peers. For instance, based on the statistics, "Tarleton's Quarter" is more myth and propaganda than reality, but that is a topic for further discussion.



Tarleton's decision to rush into battle was based on his past successes, his underestimation of his enemy, and his inexperience dealing with a force like the one waiting for him at Cowpens and a leader like Daniel Morgan. I don't think it was just sheer cockiness or stupidity. After all, the battle could (and almost did) go in a very different direction, resulting in a disastrous defeat for the Americans.

Battle of Cowpens

Heading back to the site of the battle to better understand and describe the events that occured there. Taking measuring tools and a better map to be able to go over the regiment alignments and field of view.

71st Highland Regiment