Firing in battery

The Battle of Stono Ferry Part III: The Conclusion

On the morning of June 20th General Lincoln was now set to attack the British works protecting the Stono Ferry with the Southern Continental Army. His two prong plan of attack using General Moultrie as a diversion on James Island is sound to keep the attention of the main British force from coming to the aid of the troops at the Stono Ferry while he attacks with the main force. His pickets and skirmishers are already in contact the with their British counter parts taking shots at each other and he is ready to begin the attack at 7AM. On the British side they know that the Americans are camped not to far away and they are waiting for a possible attack, they are not surprised when the Americans start to advance towards them. They were however caught in an interesting situation, with the main part of their army on Johns Island with the rest still holding the position on the Stono Ferry. Remember Prevost was trying to get back to Savannah with his army in tack and this was his most vulnerable point on the way back. So he was hoping to avoid a fight but had set his defenses up to give him the most effective defense with the least amount of troops. He also had a British Navy barge armed with heavy cannons on his left flank in the Stono River to add to his defenses.

With these two enemey armies in the initial phase of combat the American attack was dealt a major blow to its efforts without General Lincoln realizing it. General Moultrie and his diversionary force of militia had not crossed in significant numbers onto James Island because of a shortage of boats and as a result General Moultrie called of his diversion. This allowed the British to have their main army ready to reinforce the troops at Stono Ferry, because they were not threatened elsewhere once the American attack was known to be in full force at the Stone bridge head.



General Lincoln started his attack without knowing his diversion from General Moultrie was not happening. He sent his North Carolina militia to attack the Hessians on the British left flank and his Continentals from North and South Carolina to attack the British right flanks which were both guarded by cannon fortified redoubts. As they moved towards their objectives the attack started to gain steam as they started to push the British pickets back to the fortifications. However the attack on the British right by the Continentals was halted almost immediately, not by the British fire but by a marsh creek that was unknown to the Americans. For those who don’t live in the Low Country these marsh creeks are filled with pluff mud that’s like quick sand and water mixture. Once the Continentals reach this marsh creek it stopped their part of the attack instantly. On the British left flank the North Carolina militia was making head ways against the Hessians stationed there until the British barge on the Stono River started to open fire along with members of the 71st who were sent to that section to help secure their flank.



Once the attack was going the British started to send reinforcements back across the Stono River as fast as the boats could take them. The British started to rush down the cause way to get to the boats that were stationed there. General Lincoln saw that he was not making head way and that the British reinforcements were already crossing back across the river, so he called off the attack after only 55 minutes. He ordered a retreat back away from the battle field to be covered by his reserve force of Brigadier General Count Kazimierz Pulaski and his Legion along with Andrew Pickens and his upstate militia which had not been deployed in the battle. This was a good thing because the 71st sallied out towards the retreating Americans and was driven back by Count Pulaski and his force as the main force retreated towards their camps.



In the after math of the battle it was learned that out of the 900 originally deployed by Prevost 26 were killed and 163 wounded. Lincoln’s force of 1200 reported 146 killed/wounded and 150 men missing or captured after the battle in reports. These numbers are not great, but the battle won by the British allowed them to evacuate the Stono Ferry bridge head three days later with no more loss of life and to make their way to Savannah without further inference from the Americans.



The result of this battle was that South Carolina was still free of British troops near Charleston, but the British army which was out in the open and vulnerable was allowed to escape back to Savannah and its defenses. If the Americans would have been able to defeat this British force it would of been a major blow to Prevost and his army’s chances of holding Georgia. Instead as the future would show this Prevost and his army that made it back to Savannah would play a major role in the defeat of the combined French/American force that attacks Savannah and in the final attack on Charleston.

Below is a map of the South Carolina and Georgia's coast line and the roads system from around the time of the Revolution. By looking at it you can see the trail Prevost used to get to Charleston and his escape route using the coast and the sea islands to make his way back to Savannah.

Artillery at Cowpens

At the Battle of Cowpens, two artillery pieces were used with little effect by the British forces in their attempt to push Morgan from the field. The two pieces of artillery that were deployed in this battle were light three pounders. These were chosen for their ability to be moved quickly over rough terrain and so that they would not be a hindrance to Tarleton as he swiftly chased Morgan and his Flying army in the back country of South Carolina. Tarleton and his forces mission was to first prevent Morgan from contesting Ninety Six and then once it was out of harm’s way, to hunt down Morgan and defeat this isolated division of Greens Southern Army. To accomplish this Lord Cornwallis had given Tarleton some of the finest units that he had at his disposal. This consisted of the 7th Foot the Royal Fusiliers, a battalion of the 71st Fraser’s Highlanders, Tarleton legion consisting of the infantry and calvary detachments, 17th Light Dragoons, and local Tory militia. These units were use to fighting and winning in almost all of the engagements that they had participated in. They were highly trained and well decorated for their accomplishment on the field of battle. To add to these groups’ fire power two pieces of artillery were added from the Royal Artillery. However, these two pieces of artillery were not assigned to an independent artillery formation. Instead, they were assigned to two different British detachments the 7th Fusiliers and Tarleton’s Legion. The reason for this was that Tarleton’s force had come together once Ninety Six was made secure. Before then, the Seventh and Tarleton’s units were not working in conjunction and there for were put together on the pursuit of Morgan by Cornwallis. During this time of pursuit no mention is made of any artillery officer taking command of the guns which normally would of occurred with this many artillery men in one formation. Instead they are still mentioned as part of their respective units to which they are assigned.




Once Tarleton finds Morgan and his Flying Army he decides to attack at once, which as we all know, was Tarleton’s normal plan of action. Now when you look at Tarleton’s battles before Cowpens almost no mention can be found of artillery playing a role. You will find infantry and calvary charges used to great effect, where they shock the enemy into submission. So then you look into his military training and again almost no mention is made of artillery. To this point, I am not sure Tarleton knew how to deploy his artillery to effect or even cared to try since he was undefeated in most major engagements where the sword of his calvary and the bayonet of his infantry always took the day. This is where a well placed artillery officer could have played an important role, if they would have been a separate contingent of Tarleton’s formation. This officer would have allowed a voice of experience to advise Tarleton on how to best deploy his artillery. Instead the artillery was lead by infantry commanders who showed no interest in deploying the artillery in mass against the American rabble who had always yielded to cold steel.



After walking the battle field with several fellow historians, it is easy to see how the artillery would have had a difficult and incessantly time consuming job to be placed and replaced as the British formations moved forward to give them time to be effective against the American lines. This is why I think Tarleton had no love for the guns especially in this battle where he felt the enemy was corned and he smelled victory again in the air. Once the battle started with the artillery firing at the American lines they are almost never talked about again except for their capture. After walking the battle field and seeing where they first fired at the Americans and where they were captured at is quiet some distance. Given the fact, which they were trying to stay in unit cohesion with their assigned infantry units who were advancing towards the American lines, fired as they went at the Americans, and were going up and down rises in the country side it was not an easy day to be an artilleryman.



Once the British smelled victory at Cowpens, when they thought they saw the American lines break and charged towards the Americans, the artilleries usefulness almost ended because they could not fire into the American lines without possibly hitting their own troops. At this point they became bystanders to the events unfolding before them as the Americans turned on the British and counter charged them and pushed them back. This happened so fast that the artillery did not have a chance to try to even remove their guns from the battle field. Instead they did their duty which was to stand with the guns and to try to protect them which cost many their lives or horrible injury.



I feel it is safe to say that the artillery had little time to be effect against the Americans because, of the short time of the battle which lasted around 45 to sixty minutes in its entirety, their lack of unit cohesion, and because of the tactics used by Tarleton.

Royal Artillary At Cowpens

We are now working on the role of the Royal Artillary at Cowpens.